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Capital-Intensive Modernization, Internal Expansionary 
Policies, Competitive Export: The Political Economy of U.S. 
Nuclear Assistance Programs during Bretton Woods. The Case 
of Italy before the End of Fixed Exchange Rates 
 
Simone Selva  
 
Through the research perspective of U.S. nuclear assistance programs to Italy 
under the fixed exchange rate international monetary regime of Bretton Woods, 
this paper investigates the meaning and importance of high technology transfer in 
the framework of the international economic policy of the United States 
government and the Bretton Woods institutions, particularly the World Bank 
Group. Through the case study of the country most dependent on foreign energy 
supply both during the Bretton Woods years and after the demise of currency 
convertibility, we follow the U.S. assistance programs to erect and to develop an 
Italian nuclear energy industry. We aim to shed light on the linkage between the 
development of capital intensive sectors and the American aim to make the 
reintegration of each advanced industrial economy in the postwar system of 
international economic relations revolve around the combining non-inflationary 
domestic economic growth and stable external equilibrium, including both foreign 
exchange stability and sound terms of trade. We make the argument that the U.S. 
pursued this combination both during and after the collapse of Bretton Woods 
international monetary arrangements by drawing upon a flow of high capital 
intensive technology transfer. Furthermore, while focusing only on the period 
prior to floating currencies in the 1970s, this article maintains that Washington 
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carried out this foreign economic policy both under the Bretton Woods regime and 
after its demise, through foreign exchange adjustments and financial assistance 
programs respectively.  
 After reviewing how the leading literature on the history of U.S. foreign economic 
policy has portrayed it so far, we focus attention on the Italian case to explore the 
hypothesis that both under Bretton Woods and after its collapse a very close 
interlocking was established between exchange rate regimes and the U.S. policy of 
technology transfer. Through the case study of Italy, we make the argument that 
prior to the deterioration of fixed exchange rate arrangements Washington 
provided Rome with technological assistance to target the twin objective of 
advancing expansionary internal economic policies and pushing forward an ever-
rising level of international economic integration of her partner industrial 
economies. We frame this reconstruction on the decades prior to currency floating 
before a broader interpretation about the meanings of U.S. financial assistance in 
the field of high capital intensive manufacturing way beyond the collapse of fixed 
exchange rates and the end of cheap foreign energy supply. 
 
 
Introduction: Competitive Edge and Balance of Payments Equilibrium. 
Energy Policies and the Role of Technological Advance in the U.S. 
Foreign Economic Policy from Bretton Woods through the Early 1980s 
Monetary Shock 
Through the research perspective of the American economic assistance programs to 
let the advanced industrial economies develop nuclear power capacity during the fixed 
exchange rate international monetary regime of Bretton Woods floating exchange rate 
system, this paper investigates the meaning and importance of high technology 
transfer in the framework of the international economic policy of the United States 
government and the Bretton Woods institutions, particularly the World Bank Group. 
Through the case study of the country most dependent on foreign energy supply both 
during the Bretton Woods years and after the demise of currency convertibility, we 
follow the U.S. assistance programs to erect and to develop an Italian nuclear energy 
industry. We aim to shed light on the linkage between the development of capital 
intensive sectors and the American aim to make the reintegration of each advanced 
industrial economy in the postwar system of international economic relations revolve 
around the combining non-inflationary domestic economic growth and stable external 
equilibrium, including both foreign exchange stability and sound terms of trade. We 
make the argument that the U.S. pursued this combination both during and after the 
collapse of Bretton Woods international monetary arrangements by drawing upon a 
flow of high capital intensive technology transfer. Furthermore, while focusing only on 
the period prior to floating currencies in the 1970s, this article maintains that 
Washington carried out this foreign economic policy both under the Bretton Woods 
regime and after its demise, through foreign exchange adjustments and financial 
assistance programs respectively.  
After reviewing how the leading literature on the history of U.S. foreign economic 
policy has portrayed it so far, we focus attention on the U.S. assistance to Italy to 
explore the hypothesis that both under Bretton Woods and after its collapse a very 
close interlocking was established between exchange rate regimes and the U.S. policy 
of technology transfer. Through the case study of Italy, we make the argument that 
prior to the deterioration of fixed exchange rate arrangements Washington provided 
Rome with technological assistance to target the twin objective of advancing 
expansionary internal economic policies and pushing forward an ever-rising level of 
international economic integration of her partner industrial economies. We frame this 
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reconstruction on the decades prior to currency floating before a broader 
interpretation about the meanings of U.S. financial assistance in the field of high 
capital intensive manufacturing way beyond the collapse of fixed exchange rates and 
the end of cheap foreign energy supply. In fact, notwithstanding over the course of the 
1970s, the Italian authorities repeatedly proved to be unsuccessful in implementing 
their ambitious nuclear power programs,1 the government of Washington insisted on 
offering Italy continued financial support to push forward the development of energy 
policies alternative to oil through the financing of high technology sectors such as the 
nuclear industry. After the collapse of fixed exchange rates and currency convertibility, 
from the first oil crisis through to the turn of the 1970s, consistent U.S. support, 
implemented through funding from both the Export-Import Bank of the United States 
and, to a lesser extent, a few American commercial banks and the private capital 
markets, replaced the functioning of pegged but adjustable foreign exchange rates 
typical of Bretton Woods to support for at a time both the re-making of domestic 
industrial productivity and competitiveness, and internal aggregate demand, as well 
as the external equilibrium of Italy. As it clearly stems from the IMF articles of 
agreements,2 prior to the end of currency convertibility in 1971-1973, a chance to adjust 
foreign exchange rates worth up to 10 percent out of fixed exchange rates was essential 
to advance the economic growth of each industrial economy most dependent on 
foreign energy supply. This came about in that slight adjustments let each country 
combine internal expansion and a rising share of foreign exchange in goods and 
capital. In fact, exchange rate adjustments were pivotal monetary engines to provide 
industrial economies dependent on foreign energy supply with relatively cheap oil and, 
more importantly, inexpensive import of capital intensive instrumental and capital 
goods, both much needed to bolster industrial productivity and to develop an import 
substitution energy program through nuclear power. Therefore, this exchange rate 
adjustment policy was to ease off import related liabilities on current accounts. In turn, 
as far as real exchange rate movements increased the competitive edge of the industrial 
economies by means of easing off import costs for raw material and capital goods, this 
paved the way for redressing the share of international trade without any need to 
implement wage-curbing policies. On the other hand, the industrial economies 
resorted to devalued real exchange rates to sustain their export industry in the aim to 
expand the assets in the balance of payments on current accounts. 
Before this broad backdrop, in each of these respects Italy turns out to be a 
paramount case in point. During the Bretton Woods decades, industrial economies 
such as Italy on the one side went for slightly revaluing their real exchange rates to 
import capital intensive investment and instrumental goods, as well as hydrocarbons. 
On the other hand, as the government of Rome and the Bank of Italy showcase, they 
raised real exchange rates to the official exchange rates in support for the export 
                                                     
1 I have recently expanded further on this topic in my own S. Selva, Technological Advance, 
Transatlantic Trade, External Equilibrium. American Financial Assistance to the Italian 
Nuclear Power Programs from the 1960s through the first Oil Crisis, in S. Muller (ed.), 
Contesting Deregulation: Debates and Practices in the West since the 1970s, Berghahn, New 
York, forthcoming in 2015. 
2  The Art. 1/v of the IMF article of Agreements calls on the member countries to make any 
possible effort to target at the same time both internal economic stability and employment, 
and balance of payments equilibrium (IMF Articles of Agreement). On the complex interplay 
between this twin objective and the 10 percent range of exchange rates adjustments since the 
foundation of the IMF see G.M. De Vries, Balance of Payments adjustment 1945 to 1986, IMF, 
Washington DC 1987, pp. 9 ff.   
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industry and to better the balance of payments on current accounts. Since the end of 
pegged but adjustable international monetary relations, over the course of the 1970s 
the financing of capital intensive nuclear power programs pushed forward that growth 
strategy aimed at tackling at the same time losses in industrial productivity and 
competitive edge, sustained domestic aggregate demand, as well as balanced terms of 
trade and international payments position. Furthermore, the many crises that shook 
up the oil producing countries of the Middle East and their oil supplying capacity in 
the very beginning of the 1980s made the U.S. support in that direction all the more 
necessary. Particularly, this was the case for countries like Italy that suffered most 
from that instability and the ensuing dwindling oil supply from the OPEC member 
states of the Middle East. Alike, the American assistance to Italy to develop nuclear 
power capacity way beyond the collapse of fixed exchange rates before the backdrop of 
overheating crude petroleum prices should be placed in the context of a structural shift 
in the way in which the U.S. and the OECD managed the international economy during 
the 1970s. In fact, during the second half of that decade, a historical turn led to move 
away from demand management policies carried forward thus far, particularly by the 
Carter Administration3. Throughout the 1970s the U.S. had repeatedly pressured their 
most important western allies, first and foremost the Federal Republic of Germany 
and Japan, but Italy and the United Kingdom as well, to make them borrow from the 
oil supplying countries and the IMF to finance the recasting of industrial productivity 
after the early 1970s’ falloff. In doing so, the U.S. and the international economic 
institutions aimed to re-launch competitiveness and to redress the balance in the 
terms of trade of the industrial nations without curbing the cost of labor and domestic 
growth.4 As President Carter put it amid the storm of the second oil crisis, “the 
                                                     
3 The historical origins of this expansionary approach to the sluggish trend typical of both the 
international and the U.S. economy amid the two oil crises lay in the early Ford 
Administration's analyses and reaction to the inflationary strains from which the advanced 
industrial economies suffered following the first oil price hike. See for example an uneven 
speech by Arthur Burns on the impact of inflation on the rise in money supply through the 
expansion of banks deposits, sight and short term deposits and savings as a result of economic 
expectation for a downswing economic cycle following the meteoric rise in energy and 
consumer goods prices. See Statement by the Honorable Arthur F. Burns Chairman, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, in The Financial Conference on Inflation, held 
at the Request of President Gerald Ford and the Congress of the United States. Discussion 
Papers and Proceedings, Washington DC, 1974, pp. 35-41. It is worth noting that on that 
occasion Burns came up with a concluding remark stressing the role of strict monetary policy 
as a very temporary measure to fight inflation. In his view, expansionary economic policies 
should quite soon replace tight control over the monetary aggregate. Meaningfully, he made 
his case for an expansion in the supply of money and credit to run counter high interest rates.  
4 For an eye-opening sample of this U.S. foreign economic policy directive see for example, 
among the many primary sources available, the following reference documents: Anthony 
Solomon-Richard Cooper, to Economic Policy Group, Memorandum 'Strategy for the Summit. 
Global Economic Recovery and Stability', March 22, 1977, in National Archive and Records 
Administration, Archive II, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NARA), RG56 (General Records 
of the Department of the Treasury), Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, 
Deputy Director of the Office of International Monetary Affairs, Subject Files 1977-1979, b. 2, 
fold. London Summit 1 of 4; Economic Policy Group, 'International Financial Issues', March 
1977, ivi, b. 2, fold. London Summit 4 of 4; Thomas Leddy to Anthony Solomon, Memorandum 
'Notes for your Meeting of Economic Policy Group Deputies on the Summit, Tuesday March 
8: Draft on Economic Recovery and Expansion', March 7, 1977, ivi, b. 2, fold. London Summit 
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industrial democracies particularly need to adopt and maintain coherent public 
policies that will improve the ‘supply side’ of our economies: tax, labor market and 
other measures that encourage higher productivity, resistance to short sighted 
protection of uncompetitive sectors, and careful balancing of the social objectives of 
regulatory functions with our productivity goal.”5 This policy was to combine a capital 
intensive industrial restructuring and support for domestic aggregate demand. 
Furthermore, it assumed substantial borrowing from the international capital 
markets.6 This strategy assumed to draw upon the then booming oil revenues of the 
OPEC countries to finance a capital intensive industrial restructuring aimed to redress 
productivity and to reshape competitiveness on the export markets without curbing 
nominal wages and labor purchasing power. Since as early as the spring of 1974, as a 
result of the four-fold oil price hike, an unprecedented expansion in the oil revenues 
assets of the oil producing countries did occur. Shortly after the first petrodollar 
bubble, that capital intensive industrial restructuring strategy led the industrial 
economies to draw upon the then booming oil revenues of the OPEC countries. The 
government of the United States was in the forefront of this strategy. Notwithstanding 
a clear-sight tendency in early 1974 by the economic elites of the Middle Eastern oil 
producing countries to invest oil revenues on short term, highly liquid placements, 
since the second half of that year thereafter a substantial shift did occur toward 
investing money in long term bonds and other securities7. This accounted for the 
ensuing inflow of foreign finance into the advanced industrial economies that helped 
to replace the adjustment of pegged exchange rates both in financing the import for 
                                                     
3 of 4; 'Strategy for the Summit', March 22, 1977, in Declassified Documents and Reference 
System (hereafter DDRS).  
5 J. Carter to Lloyd Bentsen (U.S. Senate Joint Economic Committee), June 23, 1979, in J. 
Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta (hereafter JCPL), White House Central File (hereafter 
WHCF), Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Confidential FO 6-9 1/20/77-1/20/81 through Executive 
FO 8 4/1/77-5/11/77, b. FO-46. 
6 This strategy by and large stemmed from a widely-shared view about the impact of the first 
oil crisis on the distribution pattern of investments across the international capital markets: 
according to the OECD, “insofar as purchasing power was shifted to a group of countries with 
above average propensity to save”, the main concern was about the deflationary impact of the 
peaking oil revenues and the shortfall in aggregate demand. In this framework the U.S. 
Treasury Department and the OECD agreed on pursuing expansionary policies through 
tackling “the demand side” (OECD, Working Party n. 2 of the Economic Policy Committee, 
Note by the Secretariat, 'The Macro-Economic Impact of Higher Energy Prices over the 
Medium Term', December 2, 1974, in NARA, RG56, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
International Affairs, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Monetary and 
Investment Affairs, Records Relating to OECD Monetary Committees and Working Groups 
1961-1974, b. 15, fold. EPC/WP-2 Documents 1973 (Cont'd) 1 of 2.  
7 Department of the Treasury, Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Board 
Briefing 'OPEC Trade Balances in 1974 and 1975', March 31, 1975, in NARA, RG56, Office of 
the General Counsel, Records Relating to OPEC Financial Affairs 1974-77, b. 3, fold. O 1975-
78; Remark by David Rockefeller, Chairman, The Chase Manhattan Bank, before the W. 
Wilson International Center for Scholars 'Monetary Aspects of the Oil Problem', February 6, 
1975, in International Monetary Fund Archives, Washington DC (hereafter IMFA), Office of 
the Managing Director Fonds, Witteveen sous Fond, b. 3 (correspondence), fold. 3; Bill 
Witherell (Department of the Treasury), Briefing Paper for George Shultz, 'Oil Producing 
Countries External Investments of Surplus Revenue', January 15, 1975, in NARA, RG56, Office 
of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Chronological File of the Office of Financial 
Resources and Energy Finance1974-1977, b. 1, fold.  Jan-March 1975. 
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capital intensive investment and instrumental goods, and in promoting the export 
industry, as well as in recovering the balance of payments from the effects of the first 
oil crisis through the development of energy sources alternative to oil. The case study 
of the OPEC member states as far as they financed the U.S. assistance to develop 
nuclear power capacity for civilian purposes is straightforward.8 As a matter of fact, 
the inflow of foreign financial investments both financed the import of technologies 
and, as far erecting nuclear power met the skyrocketing rise in electricity demand 
across the industrial economies,9 it was an import substitution energy chance viable 
to stabilize the balance of payments and the terms of trade of oil-scarce economies 
such as Italy traditionally was. From the recession ensuing the first oil price hikes 
through to the Carter Administration’s early move to push it forward, this strategy 
proved to be a short of leeway in two respects. On the one side, unlike the American 
will, instead of bolstering productive investments, the other advanced industrial 
economies repeatedly tended to borrow from the international capital markets to 
finance private consumption, a policy heading to an inflationary use of capital offer.10 
On the other, during the Carter years the industrial economies fell into an ever rising 
financial path dependence on the OPEC nations, and particularly on the Middle East 
oil producing countries. This strategy came about as long as the U.S. and the other 
industrial nations called on the oil revenues rich countries for financing their demand 
management strategy. This was particularly the case for the U.S. banking system that 
since the first oil price rise had been issuing a large amount of bonds to the Arab states 
                                                     
8 As early as the winter of 1973 the U.S. Treasury Department discussed a proposed “private 
sector uranium enrichment facility” that was to involve financing from Iran worth up to 20 
percent. See W. Witherell to Undersecretary Bennett, 'Attendance at Inward Investment Policy 
Review Meeting', February 18, 1975, in NARA, RG56, Office of the Assistant Secretary for 
International Affairs, Chronological Files of the Office of Financial Resources and Energy 
Finance 1974-1977, b. 1, fold. TEFRP/OFRPC Perm. Chron. January-March 1975. From the 
recently declassified secret negotiations on the American hostages in Iran we now know that 
by the time his regime collapsed, Komehini held several financial assets in the French nuclear 
power programs. See for this U.S. Congress, Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban 
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, ' Iran: The Financial Aspects of the Hostage Settlement 
Agreement', July 1981, in Federal Reserve Bank of New York Historical Archive, New York City 
(hereafter FRBNYA), Central  Files, C 261 IRA  Dec. 18, 1979-Jan. 2, 1980 Iran Blocked 
Accounts. 
9 By the late 1960s the objective of expanding energy production to meet peaking electricity 
consumption through technological advance was not limited to nuclear power. In the U.S., 
then a booming energy market, a technological leap forward was the linchpin to target a 
significant increase in energy production from traditional energy sectors such as the coal-
burning industry. In this respect it is eye-opening to get an understanding about how the 
western world discussed this topic at multilateral level: 'OECD Confrontation on US Energy 
Policy', Opening remark of Assistant Secretary Cordell Moore, January 5, 1967, in NARA, 
RG59 (General Records of the Department of State), Bureau of European Affairs, Office of 
OECD, European Community and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Records Relating to 
Economic Matters 1953-1975, b. 13, fold. ESE OECD Energy 1967-1969. 
10 Up to this point, for the U.S. stand see for example Special Report by the U.S. Treasury 
Department in cooperation with the State Department and the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 'Submission by the U.S. representative to the Temporary Working 
Party of the OECD Economic Policy Committee on Problems related to Investment of 
Financial Surpluses by Oil Producers', May 12, 1975, in NARA, RG56, Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for International Affairs, Chronological File of the Office of Financial Resources and 
Energy Finance 1974-77, b.1, fold. Apr.-May 1975. 
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to finance its liquidity.11 A significant turn occurred in conjunction with the outbreak 
of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. 
This event posed, among others, a threat to the functioning of the dollar as the 
reserve currency for international trade and financial transactions.12 Making things 
worse, the widespread instability that characterized the Middle Eastern economies at 
the turn of the 1970s, hampered the scale and continuity in oil supply from the Middle 
Eastern oil producers to the West European importers, and cast new issues before the 
U.S. strategy to finance demand management economic recovery policies by drawing 
upon the OPEC countries financial instruments. Adding to the twin leeway which we 
have just made reference to, the impending instability shaking up the Middle East did 
contribute to make the U.S. economic policy makers go for a move to shift the 
industrial restructuring away from demand management policies and a demand side 
oriented reorganization of industrial productivity and competitiveness, to set off a 
supply side strategy. This turning point did take place in the framework of the 
watershed in the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank monetary policy to confront the economic 
recession stemming from the second oil price rise and to sort out of the decade-long 
economic stalemate. The new chairman of the Federal Reserve System moved at the 
same time to restrain the monetary aggregate, to raise interest rates, and to remove 
controls on transnational capital movements.13 This landmark policy, combined with 
the implementation of balance of payments financing facilities by the IMF to its 
industrial nations member countries made strictly conditional upon the adoption of 
structural adjustments programs including both control over the banking system to 
promote selected credit policies, and transfer of the tax burden from labor to industry, 
set off a strikingly different strategy to pursue at a time the redressing of industrial 
competitiveness and the stabilization of the external equilibrium. As a matter of fact, 
this new U.S. international economic policy assumed that the industrial countries 
beneficiary of foreign financial assistance implement a number of mandatory internal 
economic policies that run counter to the demand management policies carried 
forward thus far of which the development of nuclear power capacity was a key asset. 
In fact, the new U.S. economic and monetary policy came at variance with the aim at 
promoting demand side growth patterns and industrial restructuring through the 
combining of external equilibrium and domestic economic development that the 
Carter Administration still made the case for before the other industrial nations during 
the 1977 London Summit.14 Since the new head of the Fed, Paul Volker, set out the new 
                                                     
11 See for example C.A. Cooper-G. Parsky, Memorandum for Undersecretary Yeo, 'Church 
Subcommittee request for Bank Data', April 17, 1979, in NARA, RG56, Office of the General 
Counsel, Assistant General Counsel, Records Related to OPEC Financial Affairs 1974-1979, 
b.3, fold. N Part 1 of 2, 1977-1978; R. Kessler, Banks Hold Huge Foreign Deposits. U.S. 
Examiners Worried about Pressure from Governments, "Washington Post", January 14, 1976, 
pp. A1-A2. 
12 Department of the Treasury, Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, 
'Financial Implications of the Iranian Situation', September 3, 1979, in NARA, RG56, Office of 
the General Counsel, Assistant General Counsel, Records Relating to OPEC Financial Affairs 
1974-79, b. 3, fold. N Part 2 of 2 1977-79. 
13 In this framework, following up the directive of the Federal Reserve System, since the spring 
of 1980 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York passed a comprehensive set of anti-inflationary 
measures, including both an appreciation in the discount rate and a credit restraint program. 
See in FRBNYA, Board of Directors Minutes, Volume 88 (Jan. 3, 1980-Dec. 31, 1980). 
14 A. Solomon-R. Cooper to Economic Policy Group, Memorandum 'Strategy for the Summit. 
Global Economic Recovery and Stability', March 22, 1977, in NARA, RG 56, Office of the 
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international monetary policy, the adoption of competitive edge tax programs such as 
the fiscalisation of social costs, a tight control over wage-indexation measures, and 
strictly monitored selection over domestic credit for productive investments, all came 
up as prerequisites to further implementing the IMF and the World Bank Group's 
external financing facilities drawing upon multilateral assistance programs. The 
combining of a shift in the tax burden from capital to labor, with a binding call on the 
industrial nations to channel external financial assistance to productive investments, 
and sharp cuts on public spending and other measures to restraint the cost of labor, 
chart the deep-rooted meaning of this turning point. Therefore, by the very end of the 
decade thereafter, the remaking of industrial productivity across the industrial nations 
was no longer based on the search for a balance between cutting production costs 
through advancing capital intensive added-value, and sustaining internal demand 
through expansionary economic policy measures and price-cutting energy policies 
alternative to oil. As we just stressed, both during the Bretton Woods era and after the 
end of currency convertibility the promotion of nuclear power programs took place in 
the framework of this international economic policy. Notwithstanding the new 
backdrop that the U.S. set out since 1979 onward, Washington insisted on pushing 
forward bilateral assistance to develop energy programs alternative to oil. The U.S. 
continued along this foreign energy policy as long as the new international monetary 
arrangements were to diminish further the chances to finance it through the official 
programs of the Bretton Woods institutions. In this context it is worth noting, as we 
shall do in the very last few lines of this contribution, that by the very late 1970s the 
financing of ENEL, the Italian state entity for energy that implemented nuclear power 
programs, was left with the Export Import Bank of the United States and a few U.S. 
commercial banks. This article takes a step back to the 1950s and 1960s to chart the 
deep-seated historical origins of this unfinished U.S. support to develop capital 
intensive energy programs. We aim to point the attention of readers to the early U.S. 
target to draw upon technology transfers to connect domestic economic expansion and 
external financial and trade stability prior to the Carter administration's initiatives to 
promote demand management policies through connecting the changing pattern of 
the international capital markets to the financing of a capital intensive industrial 
restructuring during the 1970s.  
 
Matching Foreign Trade and Domestic Growth in Theory and History. The 
Importance of Technology Transfer during and beyond Bretton Woods 
Since shortly after the foundations of post-World War II international monetary and 
economic settlements, scholars of international political economy and economic 
history have been searching for a balance between the construction of an international 
liberal economic order and the shaping of stable domestic economic growth and social 
stability within each of the modern industrial democracies that had overcome the 
Second World War.15 According to that leading view this combination, based both on 
                                                     
Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, Deputy Director of the Office of International 
Monetary Affairs, Subject Files 1977-1979, b. 2, fold. London Summit 1 of 4.  
15 R. Gardner, Sterling-dollar Diplomacy. Anglo-American Collaboration in the 
Reconstruction of International Trade, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1956; A. Hirschman, 
National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, University of California Press, Berkeley-
Los Angeles 1945; The economic literature investigated further this approach to shed light on 
the multiplier effect of international trade on demand and growth: C.S. Kindleberger, 
International Monetary Stabilization, in E.S. Harris (ed.), Postwar Economic Problems, New 
York 1943, pp. 379 ff.; id., The Foreign Trade Multiplier. The Propensity to Import and the 
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a staggering expansion in trade of goods and capital flows, and on dollar pegged 
currency convertibility aimed to boosting a non-inflationary domestic growth by and 
large based on foreign trade and export,16 worked as the fly-wheel to drive war-torn 
West European economies through the record-setting growth rates typical of the late 
1950s and early 1960s.17 This interpretation suggested by international political 
economists in the second half of the 1960s revolves around statistical data tracking a 
staggering excess on the international markets in offer of commodities and consumer 
goods on domestic demand over the course of those decades.18 It made the case for a 
rate of international market integration higher than domestic growth.19 This tendency 
was confirmed by the very end of the decade, when a slipping instability on the foreign 
exchange markets made key industrial nations such as the United Kingdom chose to 
devalue their currencies. On the eve of the 1970s, British imports outstripped 
absorption capacity by the domestic consumer and commodity market, a tendency 
eventually triggering a decline in purchasing power and competitiveness by the British 
import industry.20 The U.K. devalued sterling, among many other reasons, to provide 
foreign exchange earnings required to sustain domestic manufacturing, otherwise 
unable to earmark investment-financing financial assets due to losses in 
competitiveness and export lags. Before this theoretical backdrop and the historical 
economic dynamics that it portrayed, an abundant and successful historiography on 
the postwar reconstruction of Western Europe has consistently followed up this 
argument. Since the 1970s a revisionist school of historical inquiry, inclined to 
investigate either international relations or the historical trajectories of the 
                                                     
Balance of Payments Equilibrium, "American Economic Review", Vol. 39, n. 2 (March 1949), 
pp. 491-94; F. Machlup, International Trade and the National Income Multiplier, Blakiston, 
Philadelphia 1943; for a slightly different interpretation of the subject stressing a relatively 
less positive impact of foreign trade on internal aggregate demand see J. Polak, The Foreign 
Trade Multiplier, "American Economic Review", Vol. 38, n. 5 (December 1947). 
16 Along this way, the driving forces of post-WWII international business and banking 
contributed to develop the combining of international market integration and internal 
economic expansion across the advanced industrial economies through pursuing their 
multilateral free trade market strategy. See for example Opportunities and Pitfalls in Foreign 
Trade, Bank of the Manhattan Company, New York 1947; Standard Oil Company (New 
Jersey), 1949 Annual Report, in Harvard Business School, Baker Library, Manuscript Division, 
Boston (Mass.).   
17 D. Healey, 'Oil, Money, and Recession', Foreign Affairs, Winter 1979/80, pp. 217 ff. 
18 We have made a statistical comparison between import and export trends by the five most 
growing industrial economies of France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the USA from 1962 through to 1972, and their respective domestic 
growth and consumption levels based data relative on real GDP per capita and the 
consumption percentage share of real GDP per capita during the same time period. Although 
national variations occurred, in each of these five national case foreign trade skyrocketed by 
increasing between three and four fold. By contrast, in proportion real GDP grew much less 
and, more importantly, the consumptions share percentage of real GDP per capita, with rare 
few exceptions, either got stable or contracted substantially as was the case of Japan. For 
reference see respectively the Commodity Trade Statistics database (www.comtrade.un.org/ 
data/), and the Center for International Comparisons at the University of Pennsylvania world 
table (https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/php_site). 
19 R. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community, 
McGraw Hill, New York 1980, introduction and chapter 3. 
20 Bank of England Historical Archive, Economic Intelligence Department Records, Annual 
Reports, Report for the year ended 28 February 1969. 
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international economy, correctly demonstrated the relevance of capital intensive 
modernization and technological advance in binding up the reshaping of world trade 
to the resurrection of internal markets, and in making this combining a virtuous circuit 
for the postwar golden age across most of the advanced industrial democracies.21 The 
postwar transatlantic transfer in average added value technological content that 
stemmed from the post-World War II U.S. foreign aid programs and laid down the 
recasting of strategic manufacturing sectors, did this literature suggest, played out a 
pivotal role in both erecting brand new transatlantic economic relations, and 
prompting a successful resurrection of internal markets before the backdrop of rising 
volumes in international trade. Furthermore, it fueled ever expanding terms of trade 
and improving balance of payments equilibrium on either current or capital accounts. 
These trends, this scholarship argues, were typical of the timeframe from the late 
1940s reconstruction through to the 1950s economic take off.22 
Alongside this line of interpretation, mainstream historical literature focusing on 
the history of U.S. foreign economic and assistance policies from the end of World War 
II to the end of the postwar Golden age of capitalism during the 1970s has stressed the 
linkage between the U.S. move to stir a capital intensive restructuring and industrial 
modernization across war-torn advanced industrial economies on the one side, and 
the reintegration of the West European economies before the backdrop of the ever 
expanding flows in goods and capital that shaped the international economy under the 
auspices of Bretton Woods's economic institutions. Likewise, this school of historical 
studies emphasized the linkage between technology transfer and the long postwar 
steady increase in foreign trade.23 Both early studies on the U.S.-financed 
                                                     
21 The two classical reference works that account for this early debate, tough from strikingly 
different perspectives, still are C.S. Maier, The Politics of Productivity. Foundations of 
American Foreign Economic Policy after WWII, "International Organization", Vol. 31 (1977), 
pp. 607-633; and A.S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State, Routledge, London 
1992, chapter 4, particularly pp. 142 ff.; Recent quantitative reconstruction have convincingly 
followed up this argument. For a case study on the Marshall Plan impact on the reduction of 
technology adoption lags across Western Europe see D. Comin-B. Hobijn, Technology 
Diffusion and Postwar Growth, "National Bureau of Economic Research Macroeconomics 
Annual", Vol. 25, n. 1(2010), particularly pp. 237-238. 
22 D. Ellwood, Rebuilding Europe. Western Europe, America and Postwar Reconstruction, 
Pearson Longman Publishing, London 1992; A. Carew, Labour under the Marshall Plan. The 
Politics of Productivity and the Marketing of Management Science, Wayne State University 
Press, Detroit 1987; B. Boel, The European Productivity Agency and Transatlantic Relations 
1953-1961, Museum Tuscolanum Press, Copenhagen 2003. 
23 B. Eichengreen, The European Economy since 1945: Coordinated Capitalism and Beyond, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton (N.J.)-Oxford, 2007; M.J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: 
America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-52, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 1987; G. Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure. The Marshall Plan and the 
Time when America Helped Save Europe, Free Press, New York, 2007; R. Neebe, 
Weichenstellung fur die Globalisierung: Deutsche Weltmarktpolitik, Europa und Amerika in 
der Ara Ludwig Erhart, Bohlau, Cologne 2004; sector-specific studies that linked the 
introduction of high technological content to the development of the European economic 
integration process and the European construction at large added new insights on the subject. 
See for example T.J. Misa, Inventing Europe. Technology and the Hidden Integration of 
Europe, "History and Technology", Vol. 21, n. 1, pp. 1-19; C. Bouneau-D. Burigana-A. Varsori 
(sous la direction de), Le trajectoires de de l'innovation technologique et la construction 
europeénne: de voies de structuration durables?, Peter Lang, Bruxelles 2010;  "Histoire, 
Economies et Societé", n. 4 (2010), particularly the introduction by D. Burigana-P. Deloge; for 
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reorganization of the international economy after WWII, mostly focused on the impact 
of Marshall Plan aid, and more recent investigations on the follow up before and after 
the deterioration in the U.S. balance of payments equilibrium in the late 1950s, when 
Washington called on the Bretton Woods international economic institutions to push 
forward financial and economic assistance programs aimed to reorganize domestic 
growth as a prerequisite for letting industrial democracies reenter the international 
economy, made repeatedly reference to the key role of technology transfer and capital 
intensive modernization to account for the virtuous linkage between the politics of 
productivity and the shaping of a truly interdependent international economy.24 
                                                     
a country study sample see F. Fauri, The Marshall Plan in Italy. Industrial Renewal and 
Material Reconstruction; P. Tedeschi, Notes on the Marshall Plan in Lombardy. 
Technological Innovation and Vocational Training, both in F. Fauri-P. Tedeschi (eds.), Novel 
Outlooks on the Marshall Plan. American Aid and European Reindustrialization, Peter Lang, 
Bruxelles 2011, respectively pp. 39-58, and 59-90. 
24 See respectively on the one side, among other studies C.S. Maier, The Politics of 
Productivity. Foundations of American International Economic Policy after World War II, 
"International Organization", cit.; J. Zeitlin-G. Herrigel (eds.), Americanization and its 
Limits: Reworking US Technology and Management in Post-War Europe and Japan, Oxford 
University Press, New York 2010; B.Boel, The European Productivity Agency and 
Transatlantic Relations, cit.; on the other, for the U.S. move to get the international economic 
institutions born out of the Bretton Woods conference more involved in implementing 
American foreign economic policies see W.M. McClenahan, W.H. Becker, Eisenhower and the 
Cold War Economy, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (MD) 2011. From the 
deterioration of fixed exchange rate and rising prices on the international commodity markets 
during the second half of the 1960s through to the 1973 first oil shock, a sharp worsening in 
both the balance of trade and public finances of the U.S. and the major member countries of 
the World Bank Group and IMF made them reduce their budgetary contributions to the 
Bretton Woods institutions. This turn, combined with a number of other factors that 
contributed to the weakening of those institutions, led them to retreat substantially from 
financing international market integration and domestic industrial advance, making room for 
a rising role of private capital markets. During the first half of the 1970s some private American 
financial institutions took the lead in financing the reorganization of the international trade 
and payments system among the industrial economies and the less developed countries. By 
the second half of the decade the twin recession led both the Eastern European economies and 
the Latin American countries, formerly recipient of substantial financial assistance packages 
from them, to call on the Wall Street lending institutions to stop service their debt. This hit 
hard the financial soundness of American and other Western commercial and investment 
banks. At the same time this process set the course for leading the World Bank Group and the 
IMF to strike back to their past role of financing the international trade and payments system, 
by the late 1970s involving both the industrial economies, and the oil producing OPEC 
countries, as well as the non-oil supplying less developed countries, most of whom located in 
the Middle East. For the booming role of private financial markets from the 1960s down into 
the 1970s see the 1978 Per Jacobsson Lecture by Gabriel Hauge (Chairman of the Board, 
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company), The International Capital Market and the 
International Monetary System, IMF, Washington DC, September 24, 1978, in FRBNYA, 
Records of the Presidents, Paul Volker papers, 1971-1979, b. 35578, fold. 740A (1977-78 
Annual Meetings of IMF-IBRD), where private capital markets recycling capacity of oil 
exporters' surplus earnings was estimated at $250 million for the period from the end of 1973 
to 1978, compared to an official IMF financing facility totaling $7 billion (p. 7). Regarding the 
debate among the most advanced industrial economies to replace Wall Street and West 
European banking with revamping the Bretton Woods institutions see a tidy call on the IBRD 
member states for a World Bank capital increase by the president of the Washington based 
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In this perspective, a classical and long standing wave of historical studies and 
reconstructions has focused attention on the economic and social stabilization 
objectives underpinning the process of technology transfer channeled through the 
European Recovery Program (ERP) initiatives from the United States to the West 
European economies to resurrect heavy manufacturing sectors and to set in motion 
the process of European trade integration. Tough he cast many doubts on the thesis 
that the Marshall Plan was essential in resurrecting the national economies of 
continental Europe, British historian Alan Milward insisted on the contribution of 
newer technologies and the most capital intensive manufacturing sectors of the 
postwar era to account for the trade integration among the small European national 
economies specializing in supplying capital goods, and the increased demand for them 
by the German economy.25 
This line of investigation revolved around the economic impact of technological 
advances within each of the industrial economies. It has recently made way for a wave 
of fresh reconstructions and syntheses stressing the implications that capital intensive 
leap forwards and a significant rise in labor productivity since the late 1940s Marshall 
Plan financial packages through to the 1950s NATO military assistance programs, had 
on remaking the West European economies supply side competitive both on the 
domestic and on the international markets without restraining the labor purchasing 
power.26 These fresh new reconstructions share the assumption that the combining of 
orthodox anti-inflationary monetary policies at domestic level, with the 
implementation of expansionary industrial investment programs funded through 
capital inflows denominated in U.S. dollars or other hard currencies to sustain both 
the supply side in consumer goods and aggregate demand, were pivotal in re-
launching domestic growth and shaping a stable reintegration of the industrial 
economies in the context of Bretton Woods fixed exchange rates international trade 
and payments system through competitive bidding national manufacturing systems27. 
According to this interpretative framework, these works establish a neat linkage 
between a substantial technology transfer in average added value instrumental goods 
from the U.S. dollar currency area to the consumer goods producing infant European 
manufacturing industry, and the impact of a capital intensive leap forward both on 
domestic growth in that it re-launched capital accumulation without curbing nominal 
                                                     
international economic institution Robert McNamara, Address to the Board of Governors, 
September 25, 1978, ivi. 
25 A.S. Milward, The European Rescue of the Nation State, cit., pp. 142, 153-167.   
26 Two general accounts of the period following this interpretative path are D. Ellwood, The 
Shock of America. Europe and the Challenge of the Century, Oxford University Press, Oxford-
New York 2012; S. Selva, Supra National Integration and Domestic Economic Growth. The 
United States and Italy in the Western Bloc Rearmament Program 1945-1955, Peter Lang, 
Bruxelles-Frankfurt 2012. 
27 In this respect it is eye-opening the concept of impact loan adopted by the Bretton Woods 
international economic institutions to ease off the strains on the balance of payments of the 
less developed industrial nations arising out of peaking import costs of commodities, raw 
materials and instrumental goods much needed to implement industrial investment programs 
and infrastructural projects. In this respect it is still a paramount study M. Alacevich, The 
Political Economy of the World Bank. The Early Years, Stanford University Press, Stanford 
(CA) 2009;  F. Fauri, Il Piano Marshall in Italia, Il Mulino, Bologna 2009, see also my own 
Supra-National Integration and Domestic Economic Growth, cit. 
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and real wages, and on the steady increase in competitiveness on foreign markets.28 
Furthermore, this scholarship stresses the pivotal role of Bretton Woods international 
monetary system based on fixed exchange rates in letting the West European countries 
and Japan stick to all of these objectives at once. As a matter of fact, the international 
monetary agreements reached at Bretton Woods called on each country to abide by the 
fixed exchange rates but made room for one digit percentage adjustments on real 
foreign exchange rates.29 Therefore, since the establishment of currency convertibility 
through to the late 1960s the industrial democracies could either revalue their own 
currencies against the U.S. exporters or devalue toward their export markets to 
respectively ease off the cost of technological upgrades or sustain their exporters on 
foreign markets respectively.30 
We frame this study on the U.S. nuclear assistance programs in the international 
economic relations of the 1970s before the backdrop of these scholarly trajectories by 
crisscrossing the history of international transfer in capital goods, and the history of 
international monetary relations. Although in this contribution we shall limit out 
reconstruction to the timeframe during which the U.S. and the World Bank Group 
provided their European allies with nuclear assistance programs for civilian purposes 
under the fixed exchange rate international monetary arrangements set off in Bretton 
Woods, we aim to frame this study before a longer and more comprehensive 
interpretation about the importance and changing dynamics of American technology 
transfers to friendly nations from Bretton Woods through to the 1970s energy crises. 
In doing so, we challenge a leading historical interpretation about the U.S. foreign 
economic policy during and after the decades of Bretton Woods. A backbone of works 
from differing research perspectives, from monetary history and the history of the 
international monetary relations, through to the history of economic and banking 
policies in each advanced industrial economy, focused on the late stage of Bretton 
Woods to point to the collapse of the international economic system established in 
1944 as a three-fold end. These studies portrayed the demise of currency convertibility 
as the fading away in both fixed exchange rates and stable raw materials and energy 
prices, as well as the U.S. retrenchment from subsidizing the competitive edge of allied 
industrial democracies. In other words, they maintain that by the early 1970s 
Washington stopped or scaled down its commitment to funding or to propping up the 
technological upgrade of European and Japanese manufacturing systems on the 
international markets, first and foremost on the U.S. dollar area supplying markets. 
These studies point to the 1967 twin British pound devaluation and the ensuing oil 
crises that shook up the 1970s as the breaking point in the history of a post war 
international market integration based, since as early as the negotiations between the 
United States and its West European allies about the Marshall Plan aid,31 on the search 
                                                     
28 For a sketchy, though vivid, historiographic survey, see G. Toniolo, Europe's Golden Age. 
Speculations from a Long-Run Perspective, "Economic History Review", new Series, vol. 51, 
n. 2 (May 1998), pp. 258-260. 
29 H. James, International Monetary Cooperation since Bretton Woods, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 1996.  
30 For a rather different appraisal about the role of transatlantic monetary and technological 
relations during the 1960s pointing to these two issues as a matter of conflict between the U.S. 
and Europeans see H. Zimmermann, Western Europe and the American Challenge: Conflict 
and Cooperation in Technology and Monetary Policy 1965-1973, "Journal of European 
Integration History", Vol. 6, n. 2 (2000), pp. 85-110. 
31 T. Healey, Will Clayton, Negotiating the Marshall Plan, and European  Economic 
Integration, "Diplomatic History", Vol. 35, n. 2 (April 2011), pp. 229-256. 
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for a balance between recasting domestic consumer markets and sustaining 
competitive edge and foreign trade through binding up cheap energy sources and other 
commodities, and relatively inexpensive technological modernization.32 As such, 
according to this view, the turning point of the 1970s marked the collapse of an 
international growth model that had successfully made its way from the late 1940s 
through to the late 1960s.33 Before the backdrop of this interpretative path it is widely 
accepted to view the 1970s as the historical roots laying at the origins of both a path-
breaking falloff in high added value manufacturing industry, and a reappearance 
across the advanced industrial nations of labor intensive and low capital intensive 
production chains that during the following two decades plunged the Fordist mode of 
production into prolonged and sluggish meltdown, eventually setting off industrial 
demerger and hiving off. From works in monetary history stressing the end by the mid-
1960s of tight monetary policies by the U.S. Federal Reserve System aimed at 
coordinating international economic cooperation and trade integration that by the 
second half of the 1960s arguably made way for domestic oriented and unemployment-
targeting monetary and credit policies,34 to general accounts making the case for the 
demise of Fordist-Keynesian compromise as the root eventually leading to the end of 
average capital intensive serialized and standardized mass production,35 through to 
studies in historical sociology pointing to the decade as the second industrial divide,36 
a mainstream literature was successful in portraying the 1970s as the historical 
watershed leading to a shortfall in high technological content. 
 Tough authoritative historical accounts have pointed to the role that the 
appearance of flexible modes of productions had in adjusting production to fluctuating 
demand on international markets since the early 1970s without resorting to a low 
capital intensive reorganization on the supply side,37 only quite recently a bulk of 
studies in international political economy reverted that mainstream accounts, indeed 
still widely accepted among historians of American foreign relations and U.S. domestic 
economic history.38 This new wave of historical and economic inquiry points to a 
                                                     
32 T. Mitchell, Carbon Democracy, Verso, London 2011; C. Maier, The World Economy and 
the Cold War in the Middle of the Twentieth Century, in M. Leffler-A.O. Westad (eds.), The 
Cambridge History of the Cold War, Cambridge University Press, New York 2009, pp. 44 ff.; 
33 The Economics of Ostpolitik. West Germany, the United States, and the Gas Pipeline deal, 
in T. Schulz-T. Schwartz (eds.), Strained Alliance. U.S.-European Relations from Nixon to 
Carter, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010, pp. 65-83.   
34 This scholarship points to the stepping down of Alfred Hayes from his appointment to the 
presidency of New York Fed as the watershed that marked the end of a  monetary policy aimed 
to binding up selective capital investments and tight monetary policy as the linchpin to sustain 
anti-inflationary growth and the competitive position of U.S. manufacturing on foreign 
markets. See M. Bordo-B. Eichengreen, Bretton Woods and the Great Inflation, in M. Bordo-
A. Orphanides (eds.), The Great Inflation. The Rebirth of Modern Central Banking, The 
University of Chicago Press, London-Chicago 2013, pp. 460 ff. 
35 D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity. An Inquiry into the Origins of our Times, Basil 
Blackwell, London 1990. 
36 C. Sabel-J. Zeitlin, The Second Industrial Divide. Possibilities for Prosperity, Basic Books, 
New York 1984;  
37 For a convincing account along this interpretative path see E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes. 
The Short Twentieth Century 1914-1991, Abacus, London 1994, pp. 403-405. 
38 M. Nolan, The Transatlantic Century. Europe and America 1890-2010, Cambridge 
University Press, New York 2012, chapter 9; J. Stein, Pivotal Decade. How the United States 
Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies, Yale University Press, New Haven-London 
2010.  
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different periodization. It makes the argument that during the 1970s the industrial 
democracies still based their domestic growth strategies on steady market 
competitiveness resting on the linchpins of high added value manufacturing sectors 
and foreign trade.39 Besides, it argues that both the United States and most of the West 
European industrial democracies sustained growth through either demand 
management macroeconomic policies or corporatist arrangements between capital 
and labor typical of coordinated market economies. This fresh new wave of cross-
disciplinary studies share the idea that during the 1970s significant politics of 
stabilization across differing industrial democracies coalesced.40 Our approach to the 
history of the U.S. foreign economic policy after the collapse of Bretton Woods as 
aimed to stabilize the international economy through mixing up the financing of 
capital intensive industrial restructuring and the promotion of demand management-
oriented internal economic policies is intended to add fresh new historical 
reconstruction to this theoretical framework. 
Before this theoretical interpretative framework on the historical turning point of 
the 1970s and the varying ways in which the advanced industrial economies faced up 
to the economic drawbacks of the decade, so far historical research dragged the feet in 
investigating this subject, leaving with the economic and social sciences to provide the 
scholarly community and the broader public audience with the mainstream 
interpretation we have just mentioned. As a matter of fact, a rather limited bunch of 
historical syntheses on the 1970s’ process of industrial restructuring correctly pointed 
to the linkage between an overall shift in productive investments away from average 
capital intensive and mature manufacturing sectors, and the successful development 
of new high added value and labor saving sectors that ensued over the following two 
decades. Mainly from a business history perspective, this literature focused mostly, 
though not exclusively, on former large state-owned concerns and enterprises to argue 
that many of the success story international cooperation agreements among national 
entities to develop European-level industrial consortia among industrial democracies 
occurred since the 1970s thereafter in newly established technologically advanced 
sectors like aerospace industry, geological survey, telecommunications.41 Therefore 
through an overall attention to the ways by which the United States shaped its foreign 
economic policy to confront the sluggish international economy of the 1970s, and the 
international energy policy that Washington carried forward during the time frame 
from the second half of the 1960s through to the very beginning of the 1980s in the 
field of nuclear power, we follow this recently offered interpretative trajectory.42 In 
doing so, through the case study of U.S. and the World Bank Group nuclear assistance 
programs to Italy to develop energy producing capacity alternative to hydrocarbons 
prior to the collapse of fixed exchange rates arrangements that helped technological 
assistance, we frame this piece of work into a broader and more comprehensive inquiry 
into the changing role of technology from the dollar-pegged international monetary 
                                                     
39 R. Rosecrance, Débat sur l'Etat virtuel, Presses de Sciences Po, Paris 2002. 
40 D. Wass, Decline to Fall. The Making of British Macro-Economic Policy and the 1976 IMF 
Crisis, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008; P. Hall, The Political Origins of Our Economic 
Discontent, in M. Kahler-D. Lake (eds.), Politics in the New Hard Times. The Great Recession 
in Comparative Perspective, Cornell University Press, Ithaca(NY)-London 2013, pp. 129-149; 
G. Duménil-D. Lévy, The Crisis of Neoliberalism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(Mass.)-London 2011, chapter 1. 
41 For a path-breaking case in point see for example V. Zamagni, Finmeccanica. Competenze 
che vengono da lontano, Il Mulino, Bologna 2009. 
42 This long term time frame is the subject of a research paper currently under preparation. 
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system of Bretton Woods to the heydays of floating currencies in reorganizing 
productivity and easing off the strain of the oil crises on the external equilibrium of 
those energy scarce industrial economies that opted for setting off an industrial 
restructuring based on the highest added value manufacturing sectors. The unfinished 
search for a stable external equilibrium by a resource-scarce modernizing economy 
like the post-War World II Italian society makes the peninsula an exemplary case in 
point in that all along the decades following the reconstruction years, Italian economic 
policymaking pursued the country's reintegration in the international economy in the 
aim to target the objectives of capital intensive industrial productivity and relatively 
cheap foreign oil supply to respectively strengthen the assets and ease off the liabilities 
in the balance of payments on currents account.  
 
Before the Quest for External Equilibrium and the Search for 
Technological Drift: The Changing Italian Energy Regime from Prior to 
the Second World War to the Early 1950s 
In the framework of a European-wide search for import substitution energy sources 
alternative to oil, the case study of Italy's nuclear power programs is a worthwhile 
sample to investigate the interconnectedness between attempts to restore foreign 
exchange equilibrium in the West European countries as far as the 1970s oil price hike 
hurt it, and the search for a capital intensive industrial restructuring to regain sways 
on world trade market and to restore the country’s terms of trade and domestic growth 
following the harmful impact that early that decade a skyrocketing inflation had on the 
Italian manufacturers’ export and internal demand. The early U.S. nuclear assistance 
programs from the late 1950s through to the 1960s help trace to what extent way 
before the 1970s the U.S. government and the World Bank Group elites viewed of 
utmost importance the linkage between oil and energy supply, the development of 
average or high technological content industrial manufacturing, and the stability of an 
oil-scarce economy as Italy in both domestic economic development and international 
payments. Therefore, in this paragraph and the following one we bring into focus this 
theme through exploring bilateral negotiations between the United States and Italy to 
negotiate the level of American financial assistance to Rome in connection with the 
beginning and implementation of the Italian programs to build up a number of nuclear 
power plants. We further demonstrate, as we already argued in the introduction, that 
during this period the two counterparts, and particularly Italy, resorted to real 
exchange rate adjustments to smoothly support the process of technology transfer 
occurring in the framework of the Italian betting on nuclear power for civilian 
purposes. Following a short snapshot providing historical grounding on the subject, 
we focus on the development of post-World War II debates and plans to convert 
electrical power stations from oil-fired to nuclear-powered generators since they 
began in the 1950s. 
During the decades following the unification of Italy, fossil fuels accounted for only 
a very modest percentage, less than 10 percent of the country's total energy supply. 
The contribution of coal and other fossil fuels to the total energy balance of Italy 
definitely crept up during the time frame from World War I to the late 1930s, when it 
rose from about 40 percent to almost 50 percent.43 During the interwar years two 
dynamics triggered further this upswing demand for fossil fuels for physical output. 
On the one side the war industry demand for oil and fossil fuels empowered energy 
                                                     
43 P. Malanima, Energy Consumption in Italy in the 19th and 20th Centuries, CNR, Napoli 
2006. 
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supply; on the other, a fundamental turnaround from agriculture to manufacturing 
marked the history of the Italian economy during those decades. This watershed 
prompted a structural shift from waterpower-based economic activities typical of post-
unification Italy such as agriculture and labor intensive cotton industry and handcraft 
manufacturing,44 to the development of  mechanization in agriculture and the 
expansion of the mechanical, metalworking and chemical industry. This turn in the 
history of the Italian economy contributed to increase the industrial demand for 
electricity. Therefore, during the 1930s and early 1940s the onset of colonial wars and 
the ensuing participation of the country in the Second World War drove up the internal 
demand for fossil-fuels powered energy production. Besides, the process of industrial 
modernization, coupled with the fascist regime’s policy of economic self-sufficiency 
and autarchy, made it clear that the peninsula’s traditional scarcity in raw material 
and energy primary sources represented an Achilles' heel to the country’s industrial 
take off and its positioning in the international system of political and economic 
relations.  
As such, the need to meet the rise in electricity demand led to devise policies of 
energy diversification by means of pinpointing energy sources alternative to coal and 
its by-products. Furthermore, this search for energy sources to replace coal was to 
target Italy's long-standing energy dependence on foreign supply. Since the very end 
of World War II the United States viewed the Italian effort to develop domestic energy 
supply an important strategic asset to the country's postwar industrial resurrection.45 
In this context, since shortly after the end of the Second World War the Italian 
economy came through an historical drift from coal powered energy supply to oil and 
its hydrocarbon compounds. This shift took place under the aegis of a U.S. and NATO 
international energy policy that after the war made a clear bet on oil. Soon after the 
end of the war the U.S. raised both the level of oil production for domestic uses and to 
export to friendly nations of Western Europe at an unprecedented pace.46 On the other 
hand, Washington reshaped the U.S. foreign policy in the aim both to establish most 
favored nation oil drilling and trade agreements with Venezuela, at the time the main 
Latin American oil producer,47 and to make any effort to bring under the U.S. sphere 
of influence the oil-rich producing economies of the Middle East.48 
In the making of this U.S.-led international energy system, the reshuffling of the 
Italian energy policies around what the historical literature has termed the 
“hydrocarbon paradigm” did not ease the country’s dependence on foreign supply of 
energy sources. By contrast, as long as over the two decades following World War II 
                                                     
44 P.A. Toninelli, Energy and the puzzle of Italy's economic growth, "Journal of Modern Italian 
Studies", n. 1 (2010), pp. 107-127. 
45 In the framework it is exemplary the U.S. position within the Allied Commission: see for 
example Harland Cleveland, 'Some Conclusions and Recommendations on United States 
Policy and Organization in Italy', May 28, 1945, in NARA, RG 169 (Records of the Foreign 
Economic Administration), Bureau of Areas European Branch, Records Relating to the 
Economic Relief Program for Italy 1943-1945, b. 2(Documentation-Procedure to Foreign 
Mission Financial Letters, fold. Financial Directives). 
46 Up to the importance of U.S. foreign reserve production and supply since World War II see 
F. Venn, Oil Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century, St. Martin's, New York 1986. 
47 D.S. Painter, Oil, Resources, and the Cold War 1945-1962, in M.P. Leffler-O.A. Westad 
(eds.), The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I, Origins, Cambridge University Press, 
New York 2010, pp. 491 ff. 
48 T. Mitchell, Carbon Democracy, cit.; D.S. Painter, Oil and the American Century, "Journal 
of American History", Vol. 99, n. 1 (2012), p. 30. 
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the country experienced an uneven economic growth and domestic market expansion, 
the Italian economy faced a peak demand for energy by and large in excess of supply. 
The unevenly industrializing peninsular economy eventually dragged structurally 
dependent on foreign supply of oil. During the decade following the end of the conflict 
on the one side Italy's consumption of hydroelectric power declined constantly; on the 
other, a substantial rise in oil consumption changed the pattern of the country's 
domestic energy market altogether. On the eve of Italy's economic take-off, oil 
accounted for roughly one-third of total energy consumption49. Throughout the 1950s, 
the country strove to curb its energy dependence on foreign markets through both an 
energy diversification policy mainly based on the search for indigenous energy 
sources, and a firm foreign oil policy to enter price-sharing negotiations with a wide 
range of oil supplier countries to import crude petroleum. According to this two-fold 
energy policy, since the reconstruction years before the establishment of the state-
owned entity for hydrocarbon compounds (ENI), the former fascist government's oil 
monopoly AGIP engaged in domestic oil and gas explorations. On the other hand, the 
search for cheap foreign oil supply led the Italian elites and the newly established ENI 
to engage in a wide set of negotiations, including both the Atlantic bloc’s oil supplying 
economies and the oil producing countries aspiring to drill, produce and distribute 
hydrocarbons free from binding relations with either the United States or the Soviet 
bloc. ENI was a front runner throughout the 1950s both in the pursuit of inward energy 
policies and in pushing forward a path dependence energy policy. In this framework 
by the mid-1960s ENI on the one side negotiated the import of Soviet crude oil for a 
total amount equal to circa 14 percent of the country's total crude import.50 On the 
other, under the leadership of Enrico Mattei the state hydrocarbon entity struggled to 
bring under its control a number of oil fields across energy-rich African countries 
through the establishment of subsidiaries and the construction of refineries in Iran, 
Somalia, Morocco, Congo, Kenya, Sudan, and Nigeria.51 Thus far an abundant 
scholarship in business history has comprehensively explored both the commitment 
of ENI after the reconstruction years to lead the Italian search for indigenous natural 
gas and methane as import substitutes, and the Italian far-ranging challenge to the 
American oil multinational operating across the international oil markets under the 
guidance of Mattei in search for profit sharing agreements.52 Before this backdrop, in 
order to grip the paramount importance of oil to the Italian foreign energy policy 
during the 1950s, it is worth mentioning the high level refining capacity that the Italian 
petroleum industry gained since the end of World War II. On the one side it led the 
                                                     
49 For this breakdown see IMD Little and Rosenstain Rodan, 'Summary and Conclusions of 
Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy in Italy', in World Bank Group Archive, Washington DC 
(hereafter WBGA), Italy- Nuclear Power Project - Negotiations 01, b. 182615B. 
50 Department of State, 'Guidelines for Policy and Operations-Italy', May 1962, p. 10, in J.F. 
Kennedy Presidential Library (hereafter JFKPL), Presidential Papers of John F. Kennedy, 
National Security Files, Country File, Italy, Reel 7, b. 120, fold. 0016. 
51 CIA, Special Report 'Recent Activities of Italy's State Petroleum Corporation', April 17, 1964; 
Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Secretary of State, Research 
Memorandum INR-91, November 2, 1962, 'Effects of Mattei's Death on Italian Oil Policies', all 
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52 For archival insights into the topic see the abundant sources in economic diplomacy easily 
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Italian business community to press the government of Rome to engage in bilateral 
trade partnership with certain nonwestern aligned oil-rich economies such as Persia 
to expand the volumes of oil import by Italy.53 On the other, the specialization of ENI 
in refining was attractive to the United States in many respect. In first instance the 
government of Washington began monitoring the security of the Italian petroleum 
industrial facilities to patron and maximize her refining activities. This U.S. policy was 
implemented according to the guidelines to implement NSC-29, “Security of 
Strategically Important Industrial Operations in Foreign Countries", a U.S. National 
Security Council policy paper approved in September 1948.54 Secondly, at the turn of 
the 1950s the U.S. oil companies and the State Department considered the issue of 
refining as part of a trade off with Mattei to face his profit-sharing energy strategy. In 
particular, Secretary of State Dean Rusk fully endorsed a draft agreement by the 
Standard Oil of New Jersey aimed to prevent Mattei from expanding ENI's commercial 
bonds with the Soviet bloc by trying “to accommodate ENI's need for assured supply 
cheap crude oil and possibly natural gas and use of Jersey refining capacity in certain 
countries as key elements in broader understanding with Mattei.”55 All these Italian 
and American energy policy stakes, paired by the exceptionally cheap and stable prices 
of crude petroleum on the international markets throughout the 1950s and early 
1960s,56 otherwise delayed the Italian search for alternative energy sources but natural 
gas, thus postponing a firm search for import substitutes from the top of the country’s 
foreign economic policy agenda.  
 
A High Degree of Bilateral Cooperation: Currency Convertibility, Foreign 
Exchange Adjustments, and the Early Steps of Nuclear Power Programs 
between the U.S. and Italy 
Therefore, since the liberation of Italy through to the 1950s economic take-off, the 
Italian business community bet on the oil-powered and gas-fuelling industry to meet 
the country's demand for electricity and energy. However, way before the 1960s the 
United States engaged in supporting Rome to undertake the nuclear energy option to 
feed up the domestic industrial and private demand for electricity. As the historical 
research on the subject correctly pointed out, as early as the late 1950s Italy reached 
international agreements to build up three nuclear power producing plants, two of 
which would be based on American technology and one based on British technology.57 
What is noteworthy from the viewpoint of this article is that they all took place exactly 
at a time, from the late 1950s through to the mid-1960s, when Italy's stability on the 
foreign exchange markets and the pattern of domestic growth experienced an uneven 
and sudden change, moving from high employment rates and steady increase in GDP 
                                                     
53 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, ‘Italy and Persian Oil’, March 31, 
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by the very end of the 1950s to a downswing economic cycle in 1963-1964 conducive 
to a worsening in the balance of payments and to shrinking growth rates. On both 
issues the U.S. government and the Italian monetary authorities agreed to cooperate 
to let the peninsula sort it out.58 Although devoid of any coordinated nuclear power 
program, the construction of these nuclear electric power facilities shed insights on 
both the early interest of the Italian governments in investing in R&D, and in 
committing the state-owned shareholdings to invest on nuclear power, as well as on 
the attitude on the part of the United States and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) to link the expected technological advance 
stemming from nuclear technology transfer to the stabilization of Italy's balance of 
payments on current accounts. Moreover, they are useful in getting a better sense of 
understanding about the importance that the Americans placed on the added-value 
spill over on the Italian mechanical and chemical industry working on procurement 
for the nuclear industry. The development of these negotiations into the mid-1960s 
proved further these stakes, showing that the Italian policymakers shared the 
American view about the interconnectedness between the nuclear power programs 
and the stability in the country's external equilibrium. In the light of these 
considerations, though the historiography had already devoted time and careful 
research to them, we touch upon these early programs to construct the centerpiece of 
this article. We focus on the so-called SENN program as it is exemplary to investigate 
economic and financial relations between the U.S. and Italy in the nuclear field as far 
as it involved the IBRD to finance the Italian acquisition of technology from the U.S. 
dollar currency area.  
The establishment since as early as 1951 and 1952 of two leading research 
institutions, the National Committee for Nuclear Energy (CNEN), and the National 
Institute for Nuclear Physics (INFN), were paired with an early wave of average capital 
intensive investments by the state shareholding National Institute for the Industrial 
Reconstruction (IRI) aimed at fostering a reorganization of its mechanical firms based 
on average technological content eventually leading to specialize in the production of 
components, instrumental goods and machinery to build up or to assembly a number 
of nuclear power stations. On the part of the Italian private manufacturers, the 
establishment of Centro Informazioni Studi e Esperienze, set up in 1946 under the 
auspices of nation-level private companies including among others Edison and Fiat to 
actively support nuclear research, led in the early 1950s to propose collaboration with 
Belgium in launching a nuclear power program.59 This early Italian move to bet on 
nuclear power, tough promising, proved rather uncoordinated. More importantly, as 
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency put it, “the financial position of the country and 
the lack of source of uranium ore at present precludes the establishment of even a 
modest program.”60 In a matter of very few years, the financing side and the 
technological issue involved in establishing a coordinated nuclear industry in Italy 
became the cockpit of American nuclear assistance that underpinned the U.S. 
diplomacy and the IBRD in providing Rome with continued support lasting through 
the very late 1970s.  
                                                     
58 Summary of Memorandum of Conversation Robert Roosa-Guido Carli 'Italian-American 
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of the National Security Council. 
Simone Selva / / Capital-Intensive Modernization, Internal Expansionary Policies, Competitive Export       21 
 
This American stand indeed turned up since the first important Italian initiative to 
produce a nuclear power program. Following the decision by Finelettra, the financial 
holding that grouped all of the utilities of IRI specializing in energy and electricity 
production, to leave Simea, a consortium involving both IRI and a number of private 
enterprises, in 1956 within IRI it was set up Società Elettronucleare Nazionale 
(SENN).61 The history of bilateral negotiations on the American economic assistance 
to build up the nuclear power plant of SENN began when under the Eisenhower 
administration both parties engaged in studies to develop nuclear power capacity for 
civilian purposes in Italy. The Italian scholarship correctly pointed out that the 
planning and financing of SENN nuclear power plant, built up 35 miles north of Naples 
on the Garigliano river under licenses from the International General Electric (IGE), 
had deep-seated roots in the international panel on the ENSI project as well as that 
the bulk of American funding came from an IBRD loan to the Italian state agency for 
the industrial development of Southern Italy, widely known as Cassa per il 
Mezzogiorno, charged with lending that loan to SENN.62  
Since the beginning of negotiations on the loan to Cassa, both the U.S. economists 
involved and the IBRD technical Mission to Rome, as well as the Italian government 
and the Central Bank of Italy representatives, focused on the opportunities and risks 
that the implementation of SENN's project posed on the Italian balance of payments. 
Since the early meetings between the IBRD Mission to Italy, the SENN, the Cassa, and 
the Italian government, the bulk of discussions on the loan, eventually fixed at $40 
million for the purchase of uranium fuel and technological components, revolved 
around this topic. As any IBRD loan to each member country of the World Bank, the 
government of Italy was requested to warrant against the loan to Cassa. In this 
framework, the Italian Treasury requested that the loan to Cassa be denominated in 
U.S. dollars “to guarantee the Cassa against exchange devaluation.”63 On its part, the 
IBRD Mission focused attention on the many ways to prevent real exchange rates 
fluctuations from impacting on the borrowing and purchases by SENN abroad and, as 
a consequence, on the liabilities in the balance of payments on current accounts. 
During negotiations, the representatives of the IBRD based in Rome proved open-
minded and cooperative toward the issue the Italians had with the likely impact of 
SENN import requirements on the international payments position of the country. 
They shared the Italian concern about the implication of purchasing nuclear 
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equipment and fuel on the stability of the Italian lira on the foreign exchange markets. 
Within the IBRD Mission to Italy they engaged in lengthy discussions on this matter. 
In first instance they considered forestalling or reducing to the least possible rate the 
cost of loan to purchase nuclear fuel on the American oil markets by means of getting 
involved the European and US nuclear authorities. In particular, in their view a first 
option was that “the US Atomic Energy Commission might provide the fuel to SENN 
and charge only interest on the value of the fuel provided.”64 In second instance, after 
a lengthy bilateral debate on whether the uranium fuel for the initial care should be 
leased or purchased,65 they made the hypothesis that the cost of fuel purchase could 
be eliminated from the import bill of the Italian nuclear power program through a 
commitment by Euratom to transfer it to SENN cost free. The relevance of devising 
ways to reduce or contain the strains of import requirements on the current accounts 
by both the Italian Treasury and the American representatives in Rome should be 
linked on the one side to the U.S. dollar currency area from which the bulk of 
equipment was imported; on the other, to the dynamics of the exchange rates between 
the dollar and the lira over the period.66 As a matter of fact, from the viewpoint of the 
IBRD, the impact of real exchange rate variations on both loan repayments and the 
market prices for the import of investment and instrumental goods could hamper a 
fundamental objective underpinning the U.S. and IBRD financial commitment to 
support the erection of nuclear power facilities across the country. Since the beginning 
the IBRD considered the project a viable chance to upgrade the competitive edge of 
the Italian industry by scaling up its technological content, reducing energy intensive 
industry production costs, and establishing a high added value producing inward 
industry vital to reduce the strain of technological upgrade on import requirements. 
All these factors were to flatly curb per unit production costs. According to an early 
study by Rosenstein Rodan, “low cost of nuclear Kwh will enable Italy to eliminate cost 
disadvantages in energy intensive industries, and expand production in those sectors 
whose rate of growth has to be restricted in the decade 1954-1964. Foreign exchange 
savings through such import savings may be considerable.” Therefore, although in his 
view it was doubtful that nuclear power machinery could be produced in Italy in a 
matter of very few years, “the indirect balance of payments effects of nuclear power 
may be thus greater than the direct ones.”67 In the framework of these objectives, the 
Mission to Rome viewed uneven real exchange rate variations or adverse currency 
denominations of import related international payments as a harmful threat. 
Along with this aim to make technological transfer a fly-wheel to better the external 
position of Italy, notwithstanding Rosenstein Rodan's skepticism about the possibility 
in the short term to lay down the foundation of a domestic capital intensive industry, 
all in all the IBRD consistently pursued a technological drift target. The approval by 
IRI-Finelettrica and the Italian government of SENN nuclear power project led to 
launch an international competitive bidding for the supply of nuclear equipment that 
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was finally awarded to International General Electric, a subsidiary of U.S. General 
Electric. In making some internal remarks on it, the representatives of IBRD in Rome 
emphasized that the decision of the Italian government to contract the Italian steel-
making, electrical and mechanical industries for the procurement of up to 70 percent 
of the component parts of the plant should be considered an important step forward 
to increase per unit technological content of the Italian industry and to let it work on 
procurement for the national government “to build complete nuclear power plant for 
Italy and possibly the foreign market.” According to the IBRD Mission this 
technological spill over would stem from the exchange of patents, licenses, and know-
how with the U.S. firms necessary to build up the plant on the Garigliano River, for 
which the selection of IGE by the Italians meant going for a water-boiling nuclear 
reactor based on American technology.68 The U.S. interest in easing off the cost of 
nuclear fuel and equipment transfer to Italy through flatting down the cost of loans to 
purchase equipment or through commitment by Euratom to transfer it cost free took 
place in the framework of this U.S. aim to also prevent that exchange rate movements 
reverse the competitive advantage that the Italian nuclear, mechanical and 
metalworking firms were to gain from technological transfer. On the Italian side, the 
Rome government showed his sharing with the IBRD of this competitive edge target 
offered by these early nuclear power programs on several occasions. We have already 
made reference to the Italian Treasury focus on the currency denominations of the 
loans to prevent uneven real exchange rate movements from pricing up the cost of 
technological imports, thus offsetting its competitive leap forward. Alongside this 
interpretative approach, it is worth analyzing the dynamics of foreign exchange rates 
between the Italian lira and the U.S. dollar from the beginning of negotiations to the 
years when this and the other nuclear power plants went into full production. It is eye-
opening to bring into focus the years from 1959 to 1962, during which on the one side 
the SENN and the other two nuclear power programs of SIMEA, located next to the 
city of Latina, and the SELNI plant in North Eastern Piedmont region, were fully 
implemented;69 on the other, trade exchange between the Italian industry and the U.S. 
supplying market were set on. During this first time frame the U.S. dollar annual 
average against the lira declined, thus charting a significant improvement in the 
exchange rate of the Italian currency that bettered the purchasing power of the Italian 
industry on the American market.70 In the framework of these foreign exchange rate 
adjustments, during those years the rise in the value of export that the Italian economy 
performed matched with both a drop off in labor intensive durables and farm products, 
and a rampant rise in the export of chemical and capital-intensive goods like 
engineering. Significantly, only during 1961 the import of capital goods from the U.S. 
market increased by 50 percent.71 This Italian exchange rate policy that helped to 
transfer capital goods and high technological content equipment from the U.S. to the 
Italian market, namely form IGE to Finelettrica, must be set in the very early 1960s 
high degree of cooperation between Italy and the U.S. in both multilateral 
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development assistance72 and, more importantly, bilateral financial and monetary 
arrangements. In particular, the appreciation of the Italian lira against the U.S. dollar, 
conducive to trade exchange in nuclear and other high capital intensive equipment 
between the two countries, was consistent with the assistance that in many ways the 
government of Rome offered to help redress the disequilibria in the U.S. balance of 
payments during four consecutive years of balance of payments surplus for Italy.73 
Among other measures, in 1962 Italy made debt pre-payments of $178 million. 
Washington considered them “a most helpful means of partly offsetting their current 
surplus against our present deficit on current accounts.”74 Alongside this line of action, 
between 1962 and 1963 the two countries reached agreement to offset the U.S. military 
expenses in Italy. A first bilateral arrangement led Italy to purchase $124 million of 
military equipment from the U.S.; in 1963 the U.S. and the Bank of Italy conducted 
further discussions for pre-financing of Italian military purchases from the U.S.75  
 
Nuclear Cooperation and Monetary Arrangements in the 1960s from 
Crisis to Renewal 
By all these arrangements, including the lira revaluation against the dollar through 
1962, Italy helped Washington to redress the international payments position of the 
dollar. By contrast to these bilateral monetary arrangements in support for the U.S. 
currency, a roughly equal exchange rate devaluation of the lira against the dollar 
occurred by 1963, right before the SENN and other nuclear power plants either began 
operating or their construction was completed.76 This depreciation of the Italian lira 
in correspondence with the end of construction programs and imports required to 
complete the nuclear power programs can be better grasped by considering the 
broader macroeconomic and monetary conjuncture that Italy experience after 1962. 
Following a decline in the rate of investments in industrial infrastructures and 
equipment,77 by 1963 a stubbornly rise in nominal wages and labor costs led to wage 
increases outstripping productivity increases. As a result of this trend, income 
redistribution laid in a shift from savings and investments to consumption that 
reversed the competitive advantage that manufacturing had gained during the heydays 
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of Italian economic boom. Faced with this situation the Italian monetary authority 
increased liquidity to meet planned investment, thus plunging the country into credit 
expansion and price-push inflation.78 Faced with the ensuing inflation and strains on 
the current account position of the lira that this downswing economic cycle triggered, 
the Bank of Italy promptly acted to run counter this curse through a number of internal 
and foreign economic policy moves. Expectations for a balance of payments deficit for 
some $750 million in 1964, led the Governor of the Bank of Italy Carli to go for both a 
stricter credit policy including a deceleration in the rate of expansion of bank credit 
and tighter commercial credit, and a full support to the export industry by substituting 
export for internal demand. In the framework of this fight to restore the international 
payments position of the lira, in first instance Italy adopted exchange devaluation 
against the U.S. dollar to resurrect the competitive position of the Italian exporters. 
Secondly, the Bank of Italy on the one side arranged a number of monetary swaps with 
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the British and the West German monetary 
authorities.79 On the other, more importantly, the Italian Central Bank made a call on 
the U.S. for getting further external financial assistance aimed to the two-fold target 
of drying up the current accounts deficit and setting off investments to reshape the 
competitive edge of the Italian industry by means of productivity-enhancing capital 
intensive investments.80 In making this claim before the U.S., Carli showed his 
consistency with the Italian and American approach to the interconnectedness 
between the search for a stable balance of payments and the shaping of a competitive 
national manufacturing system that a few years earlier had been the framework to 
conduct negotiations on the first nuclear power programs and on the earlier IBRD 
loans to the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. The U.S. authorities and the American high 
ranking officials interested in the Italian economic affairs and outlook promptly 
grabbed this point. From the view point of the U.S. government overall outlook on the 
Italian economy, Walter Rostow suggested that resurrecting the Italian economy from 
the current downturn required both restoring the balance of payments equilibrium 
and a big investment boom to link wage increases to productivity changes. In his view 
“past wage increases and end of mass labor reserve in South Italy require radical 
increase in industrial investment for Italian industry to remain internationally 
competitive.”81 On their part, in discussing the scale and scope of further IBRD lending 
to Italy in 1964, the economists of the World Bank stressed that “Carli does not make 
any distinction between the restoration of balance of payment equilibrium – for which 
he requires capital imports – and the need for capital imports for investment 
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purposes.”82 Therefore, before this rather different and shrinking Italian international 
payments position, the country continued in its effort to make the competitive edge of 
the Italian industry revolve around the pillar of technological advance and capital 
goods import. This position underpinned Italy's call for financial assistance on both 
the U.S.-backed banking corporations, then arranged in 1964 with the Commodity 
Credit Corporations and the Export Import Bank of the United States to finance the 
import of U.S. agricultural commodities and American produced goods and services 
respectively,83 and the IBRD. Due to the current account deficit the Italian economic 
policymakers lacked any chance to draw upon upward movements in the foreign 
exchange rate to alleviate the cost of technological import requirements, thus making 
foreign credit and capital inflows all the more necessary to hold up the competitive 
edge of the Italian industry. The negotiations to obtain further lending form the IBRD 
after the last $40 million to the SENN power project took place before this new 
backdrop, clearly illustrating the Italian stand and the U.S. response. In the framework 
of his visit to Washington of March 1964 to conclude negotiations for short term credit 
from the U.S. government and an automatic drawing from the IMF,84 Governor Carli 
visited the IBRD to request a loan of $300 million, stressing the urgent need to restore 
equilibrium in the current account position while sustaining large investments “to 
maintain the country's competitive position at the new wage level.”85 Although the 
Mission sent to Italy in May and June 1964 by the IBRD shed several doubts on the 
need for such a large loan from the World Bank due to the continuing lack of adequate 
justification by the Italians through developing useful projects,86 the Italian request 
found president George Woods mostly sympathetic to Carli's argument about a 
pressing need to pair import requirements for investment purposes with deficit 
financing in support of the balance of payments while keeping wage restraints to the 
least possible level and sustaining the growth level achieved from the late 1950s 
through 1961.87 The Bureau for West European Affairs of the State Department shared 
this view, stressing “that there was danger that the credit squeeze would result in 
unemployment and some recession.”88 On its part, the International Monetary Fund 
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outlook on the international payments position of Rome for 1965 firmly suggested not 
to run it unchecked.89 In the framework of this consistent focus on the linkage between 
external equilibrium, a reorganization of the competitive position of the Italian 
economy on foreign markets through productive investments based on technological 
advance and, in turn, a sustained level of domestic aggregate demand, the new flow of 
public funding on which Carli, the Cassa, the U.S. government and the Bretton Woods 
institutions reached an agreement should be set. Indeed, this call for credit by the Bank 
of Italy came at a critical time for the country's international economic position not 
only because – unlike the recent past – losses in its foreign exchange reserves deprived 
Rome of an important negotiating monetary instrument against the dollar, thus 
hurting bilateral monetary cooperation between the two countries; but also because 
bilateral cooperation in restoring the competitive advantage of the Italian economy by 
means of technological transfer came to a stalemate. The failure of the SENN plant on 
the Garigliano river, finally shut down in 1964 after going critical on several 
occasions,90 and the effects of nationalization of the Italian national energy sector of 
1962 on the IBRD credit programs to carry forward the nuclear power programs, 
threatened the continuation of full monetary and financial cooperation between the 
two countries set out earlier that decade. As the 1962 delay of the Export Import Bank 
loan to the Selni nuclear power project proved further,91 the Italian government 
expropriation of the energy sector, which included the third nuclear power plant under 
construction in northwest Italy by SIMEA92 undermined a fundamental stake 
underpinning the U.S. firm stand in support for funding the construction of the three 
first nuclear power plants by Italy. As then IBRD president Eugene Black briefed the 
Italian Ambassador to the U.S. Manlio Brosio right before the creation of the joint 
Bank-Italian government nuclear study group ENSI, Italy's best prospect to obtain 
funding from the IBRD would lay in establishing its credit in foreign capital markets, 
particularly New York, adding “that the proposed nuclear power project (of SENN) 
might well prove a good basis for an approach to the market.”93 Repeatedly averted by 
Carli and Rostow about the threat to the purchasing power of the Italian industry in 
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the foreign capital markets which acute speculative drains on the lira caused by lack of 
capital infusion and devaluation might led to, during 1964 the U.S. banking system 
involved in Italian economic matters widely shared this concern.94 This issue is crucial 
to explain why notwithstanding that critical juncture in the U.S.-Italian bilateral 
monetary relations, the two counterparts respectively undertook two foreign monetary 
initiatives conducive to push forward cooperation among the two countries in both the 
technological and the monetary fields. In fact, on the one side the Bank of Italy's option 
to intervene on the foreign exchange markets to support the current account through 
devaluation was abandoned, thus paving the way to keep the lira exchange rate against 
the dollar stable from 1963 through to 1968 at the 1958 par value.95 On the other, that 
widespread concern induced the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the U.S. 
government and the two Bretton Woods' sister international economic institutions to 
approve vast credit lines and loans programs. This new framework restored the foreign 
exchange conditions that the Italian currency and importers had taken advantage of a 
few years earlier under a full operative currency convertibility system, thus making 
room to set out new investment programs based on high technological and average 
capital intensive leap forward. 
Before this backdrop the U.S. business community and the Export Import Bank of 
the United States became involved in financing further the implementation of Italy's 
nuclear power programs since the second half of the 1960s. It is noteworthy to stress 
that the American involvement in the Italian nuclear power programs accelerated 
exactly when the devaluation of British Sterling marked the end of a stable 
international exchange rate system. In 1967, in the framework of the late 1960s 
downward trend in the cost of nuclear plants, the IBRD undertook a detailed objective 
review of the prospects for nuclear power in developing countries. In the context of 
this exercise, the Engineering Department of the World Bank made an inquiry with 
professor Angelini, then General Manager of ENEL and during the 1970s president of 
the Italian state-owned energy entity, regarding the possibility of having a Bank 
Mission sent to Italy to get useful information drawn upon the Italian experience in 
the development of nuclear reactor types and nuclear facilities.96 Coincidentally, U.S. 
General Electric became once more involved in the Italian nuclear power projects. 
Before the backdrop of the Italian state shareholding system IRI commitment to 
develop high capital intensive manufacturing sectors, in 1967 the state controlled 
Ansaldo Meccanico Nucleare set up a joint venture with General Electric to establish 
a nuclear fuel and instrument goods producing facility working under American 
licenses and technology.97 This brand new Italian-American business ventures took 
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place in connection with the approval by ENEL and the Italian government of 
construction of a new nuclear power plant in Northern Italy.98 In this context IRI and 
General Electric revamped bilateral trade exchange in capital intensive instrumental 
and investment goods at a time when international monetary negotiations to reach 
agreements on real exchange rate adjustments was pursued at both bilateral level and 
in the framework of multilateral settings such as the Bank for International 
Settlements to cope with the impact of deteriorating nominal exchange rates on the 
stability of international trade that from 1968 through to 1971 anticipated the collapse 
of Bretton Woods monetary arrangements.99 This U.S. involvement anticipated the 
unfinished commitment during the 1970s by both General Electric and Westinghouse, 
and the Export Import Bank of the United States,100 as well as some American 
commercial banks such as Chemical Bank, to support the Italian energy diversification 
programs by combining technological drift and foreign exchange savings.101 This 
policy, fully backed by the State Department during the 1970s, prolonged into the new 
decade the U.S. strategy to both restore the competitive edge and the international 
payments position of a foreign oil supply dependent partner industrial nation. 
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